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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATl'RE OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs, Lucia Navo, Serena Navo, and Nicole Navo (Navos), appeal the District
Court's decision to dismiss defendant/respondent Bingham Memorial Hospital (Brv1H) from their
wrongful death claims stemming from the death of Ellery Navo after he had received surgery at
BMH to replace a rod in an infected broken ankle. Navos allege that the District Court erred in
excluding their hospital expert on summary judgment. and then later dismissing BMH entirely
from the case despite factual issues as to the hospital· s potential liability under the doctrine of
apparent authority.
COl:RSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On December 29, 2010. Navos filed their Complaint alleging, in four counts, the right to
recmer damages from Sayre 1 and BMH for the ,vrongful death of their husband and father. R.,
Vol. 1. pp. 1, 26-31. 2 Sayre answered denying liability on July 18. 2011. R., Vol. I, pp. 2,
On August 24, 201 L defendants Sayre and Monroe filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment. R., Vol. I, p. 3. Since the case against Monroe has been dropped, and the case against

The Complaint named not only nurse anesthetist Sayre as a defendant. but also nurse
anesthetist Matthew _Monroe. In the course of discovery it became clear that although both
anesthetists cared for Ellery Navo during the surgery, the damage to Ellery \\as complete before
Momoe took over from Sayre. Thus, plaintiffs did not pursue the case further against Monroe.
1

The Clerk's Record as provided to the plaintiffs consisted of three (3) electronic files,
each having pages separately numbered beginning with page 1. Plaintiff has identified those files
in this brief as: (1) the file entitled "Clerk's Record on Appeal," which consists of pages 1-1099,
as Volume I; (2) the file entitled "Clerk's Supplemental Record on Appeal," which consists of
pages 1-14, as Volume II; and (3) the file entitled "Supplemental Clerk's Record on Cross
Appeal, which consists of pages 1-236, as Volume III.
2
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no further discussion
as

that motion for summary judgment follows

to BMH.

BMH never filed an Answer to the Complaint. Instead, it filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on November 17. 201 L supported by the Afiidavit of Cynthia Christensen. the
Affidavit of Dan Cochran. and a brief R.. Vol. I. pp. 4. 40-41.

57-60, 42-51.

Pursuant to a scheduling order entered by the court on December 19, 2011, R .. Vol. I. pp.
93-94. on January 18.2012, the Nmos filed an Affidavit of Counsel. the Affidavit of Samuel H.
Steinberg. and a brief in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. R .. Vol. L pp. 6.
95-255.256-268.295-312.
After the matter \Vas fully submitted. on February 27. 201

the trial court issued its

Decision: Defendants' Motion fr,r Summary Judgment & Motions to Strike, as \Vell as a
Judgment thereon. R., Vol. I. pp. 7, 397-416. The court's decision struck the entire Affidavit of
Samuel H. Steinberg and granted summary judgment to BMIL as well as to Sayre and J'v1onroe.
Navos moved for reconsideration of the court's decision on March 12, 2012, supported by
Supplemental affidavits of Dr. Peter Schulman and Dr. Samuel Steinberg. R.. Vol. L pp. 8.
417-436. On July 24. 2012. the District Court issued its Decision on Plaintiffs' Motion to
Reconsider and Defendants' Motions to Strike. R., Vol. I. pp. 494-516. The court granted
Navos· motion to reconsider as to Sayre and BMH on Count One of the Complaint but upheld
its prior decision on summary judgment as to Counts Two, Three and Four. R., Vol. I, p. 515.
Thereafter, on March 20, 2013, BMH moved for reconsideration of the court's July 24,
2012, decision leaving open Count One as to BMH based on the theory of apparent autbority. R.,
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 5

L pp. 589-590. That motion was renev,:ed tvvo weeks later on April 4.
Bl\1H filed a memorandum and the affidavits of

13.

vvith

and of Jeff Daniels. R..

Vol. L pp. 695-696, 807-808. NaYos offered the affidavit of Lucia Navo in opposition to BMtr s
renewed motion. Vol. I, pp. 946-851. On April 17, 2013. only two days before the April 19.
2013. hearing scheduled on the motion. BMH offered the affidavit of Janelle K. Larsen in
support of its motion. R .. Vol. L pp. 957-970. Narns filed a "l\fotion to Strike Untimely
Affidavits" on April 18. 2013. On May 31. 2013. the court issued its Decision on Motions
granting BMH's motion for reconsideration. deciding that plaintiffs had failed to adequately
plead the legal theory of apparent authority and that, even if it had properly pied that theory,
BMH vvas entitled to summary judgment on the issue. R.. Vol. L pp. 1015-1024. This decision
resolved all claims involving BMH against the Narns. but left open the matters against Sayre for
trial. The court declined to enter a Rule 54(b) Certificate of Final Judgment as requested by
BMH. R., Vol. L p. 1040.
As the result of a settlement between Sayre and Navos, on June 18, 2014, the parties filed
a Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice of Plaintiffs' Claims Against Defendant Ryan Sayre.
R .. Vol. L pp. ] 070-1071 . That having resulted in a resolution of all claims of all parties, the
court entered final judgment dismissing all claims against all parties, with prejudice, on August
4, 2014. R., Vol. I, p. 1074.
Forty-two days later, on September 15, 2014, Navos filed their Notice of Appeal as
against the defendant, Bingham Memorial Hospital, only. R., Vol. I, pp. I 076-1078.
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STATEME:\T O_F FACTS

rs motion for summary Judgment focused exclusively on

relating to

standard of care and its compliance or non-compliance \Vith that standard. But the background
facts have never been contested.
On December 15. 2008. Ellery Navo. a 36 year-old Natiw American member of the
Shoshone-Bannock Tribe. was admitted into Bingham Memorial Hospital for treatment of an
infected ankle that had been surgically repaired the previous month. On December 19. 2008, the
decision was made to surgically remove the rod that had been inse11ed to repair Ellery·s ankle.
That surgery took place the following day at approximately 12:30 p.111.
Sayre administered the anesthesia through a procedure referred to as a --spinal.,. Shortly
after the anesthesia \\'as administered, Ellery·s blood pressure, heart rate, and oxygen levels
experienced a severe drop. He also lost control of his own breathing, and Sayre then converted
the spinal anesthesia to general anesthesia. It \Vas some time before Ellery's systems were
controlled and brought back to normal levels. After Ellery's systems were stabilized. Monroe
took over anesthesia care of Ellery. but at the end of the surgery :t-.fonroe was unable to revive
Ellery from the anesthesia and he remained unconscious and non-responsive until his death on
December 30, 2008. R., Vol. L p. 298.
Ellery Navo was survived by his spouse, Lucia Navo, and by tv,:o teenage daughters,
Nicole and Serena Navo, who are the plaintiffs in this case.
The crux ofNavos' complaint regarding the cause of Ellery's death is set forth in the
Affidavit of Dr. Peter Schulman. a board certified anesthesiologist as well as an attending
APPELLANTS. BRIEF - 7

physician and assistant professor of anesthesiology at Oregon Health & Science University in
Portland. Oregon. R.. Vol. I. p. 270. Dr. Schulman gave his opinion that the care provided to
Ellery Navo in December 2008 failed to meet the standard of health care practice in Blackfoot.
Idaho. Among other problems. Dr. Schulman noted that:
•

Except for the word '·spinal"' listed on the Pre-Anesthesia form and vvhat \Vas
listed at the top of the form. the preoperative anesthesia evaluation and anesthesia
plan did not accurately reflect or take into account the full nature and extent of
Ellery Navo· s pre-surgery co-morbid medical conditions.

•

Sayre did not discuss the case v,ith the surgeon. Dr. \Voods, or any other physician. anesthesiologist. or CRNA prior to the surgery.

•

Sayre's discussion with Ellery Navo about his medical history ,vas brief and he
did not speak with Ellery" s vvife, children, or other relatives.

•

It vvas unclear whether Sayre reviewed Ellery·s chart or medical records prior to
the procedure, and if he did, it was a cursory and superficial review.

•

Critical problems such as Ellery's morbid obesity, risk factors for obstructive
sleep apnea, and recent fever were not noted on the pre-anesthesia form.

•

Ellery vvas administered a relatively high dose Propofol infusion (a powerful
sedatiw-hypnotic typically used for sedation and/or for the induction of general
anesthesia), the administration being at a fixed rate and not titrated to effect.

•

within five minutes after administration of the "spinal," Ellery experienced a
profound drop in blood pressure (hypotension) and in heart rate (bradycardia) that
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lasted for a significant period
length
•

\Yas

time. Ellery became unresponsive, although the
\Vas not

in addition. Ellery's blood oxygen saturadion dropped (hypoxemia). and again this
was not accuratelv recorded on the anesthetic record. One record reflected ''mid
70's and low 80's'· and another record showed a consistent ·'99%''.

•

The Propofol infusion was never down-titrated or turned off during the period of
hypoxemia.

•

After Ellery's oxygen saturation dropped. Sayre administered Propofol as a
'"bolus .. (a rapid intravenous injection). although this was not recorded.

•

To treat the hypotension and bradycardia, Sayre administered several doses of
Ephedrine and one small dose of RobinuL but did not administer ephinephrine.

•

Sayre did not communicate with the surgeon other than to report Ellery's drop in
heart rate and blood pressure, and he did not call other anesthesia providers for
additional help.

•

This history reflects numerous unacceptable errors.

In summary. Dr. Schulman opines, ''the cascading sequence of adverse events that ensued
in this case were the direct result of inadequate preparation for anesthesia, a poorly designed and
initiated anesthetic plan, and an inadequate response to the instability that ultimately occurred.
This combination of factors, in the aggregate, resulted in Mr. Navo's death." R., Vol. I, pp.
274-282.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF -- 9

noted, BMH's motion for summary judgment fixused on whether the hospital could
held

for Ellery

s

In

its

offered the two page

affidavit of its chief nursing officer Cynthia Christensen, who essentially testified that the
"nurses" responsible for Mr. Navo 'scare "complied ,vith the applicable local community
standard of health care practice,. but that ·'nurses arc not involved in the decision-making process
relative to" anesthesia care. R., Vol. L pp. 50-53. BMH also offered the affidavit of its COO Dan
Cochran who claimed that anesthesia services are provided at the hospital by nurse anesthetists
that are employed by Blackfoot Anesthesia Services. LLC. R., Vol. I, pp. 57-59. 3
In response. Navos offered the affidavit and report of Dr. Samuel Steinberg. R., Vol. L
pp. 256-268. Dr. Steinberg's experience and background included numerous years as a director
and hl)Spital administrator. an MBA in health care administration, a Ph.D. in Organization &
~1anagerncnt, and many years experience on a university faculty. R., Vol.

L pp.

259-264.

Dr. Steinberg's affidavit and report expressed his opinion that the care provided to Ellery
Navo by BMH and its stair~ contractors, and employees violated certain specific Joint Commission standards, v;hich was a failure of the standard of health care practice in the community in
·which BMH serves and operates. R., Vol.

L p.

266. Because the Joint Commission standards are

specifically adopted by regulations of the Idaho Department of Healtl1 and Welfare, and are

BMH also filed a Second Affidavit of Jennifer Brizee and an Affidavit of Judith Nagel
on January 20, 2012, the same day as the hearing held on the motion. R., Vol. I, pp. 321- 328,
355-358. Seven days later, on January 27, 2012, BMH filed the Affidavit of Tina Cobia. R.,
Vol. I, pp. 371-380. The District Comi did not refer to any of these woefully late affidavits in its
Memorandum Decision. R., Vol. I, pp. 397--429.
3
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applicable by
to the conduct

to hospitals throughout the State, Dr. Steinberg applied those
B!v1H. especially in relation to

care

to

In particular. but not exclusively, he reported:
•

BMH lacked a required contract with Blackfoot Anesthesia Services. which
provided Sayre as a nurse anesthetist to BMH and its patients.

•

BMH lacked a required collaboration agreement bet\veen Blackfoot Anesthesia
Services· nurse anesthetists. such as Sayre. and a qualified physician. dentist or
podiatrist.

•

BMH lacked the required Chief of Anesthesia/physician director of anesthesia
services.

•

Biv1H lacked required policies and procedures, approved by the physician director
of the anesthesia service, to guide the hospital's anesthesia program.

R., Vol. L pp. 266-268.
In short. BMH had no vvritten policies, requirements. contracts, or standards to govern the
administration of anesthesia in its hospital. BMH had done essentially nothing to ensure that
anesthesia provided by nurse anesthetists at its hospital \Vas done at any level of competence.
Instead, it attempts to rely exclusively on Blackfoot Anesthesia Services to perform all of its
responsibilities in that regard. As a result, Dr. Steinberg· s opined that B:rv1H violated the
following Joint Commission Standards:

APPELLANTS' BRIEF~ l l

1.

LD.1.10. ·'The hospital identifies how it is governed.
vvith ultimate responsibility

hospital has

legal authority

care.

treatment. and services.'·
J

,..,
.)

LD.1.30. ·The hospital complies \Vith applicable la'w and regulation.'·

.

LD.2.20. '·Each hospital program, serYice. site. or department has effective
leadership:·

4.

LD.3.50. ·'Care. treatment. and services provided through contractual agreement
are provided safely and effectively."'

Id.
Dr. Steinberg indicated his knmvledge \Vith regard to the local standard of care as
follov,s:
"'These Joint Commission standards are \Videly accepted in the United States as the
standard of care for the provision of inpatient hospital care, and describe the accountability and responsibility of hospital leaders in the deli wry of care at their facilities. Joint
Commission standards require that hospital leaders establish a governance structure and
management systems to oversee that appropriate rules, regulations, infrastructure.
credentialing, and communication processes are in place to deliver high quality and safe
care to their patients. The hospital is further required to establish systems to monitor the
effectiveness of care and to correct any deficiencies. Ultimately, the hospital is responsible for the oversight of all professional services provided by its medical staff employees.
and any others that it credentials or contracts with to practice at the hospital. Joint
Commission standards are also used by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid to
determine compliance with the requirements of these programs, and are also used and
accepted as the standard of care for hospital licensure in many states, including Idaho, and
Bingham Memorial Hospital is accredited by the Joint Commission and must therefore
comply with their standards. I have also spoken with Judith Nagel, RN, Associate
Director of the Idaho State Board of Nursing on January 11, 2011 to affirm that the
community standards in rural hospitals in Idaho regarding nurse anesthesia programs is
similar to standards in place across the country that I am familiar with."

APPELLANTS' BRIEF- 12

R .. Vol. L p. 266.
Nan1s also offered the Affidm it of Counsel attaching a number of written
discovery responses and deposition testimony that demonstrated. among other things. that:
L

BMI rs website lists Steve 1v1cC!ellan as the ··rv1anager·· of the ..Anesthesia
Department.·· R .. Vol. L p. 100. It does not indicate that Mr. McClellan is the
mvner and manager of Blackfoot Anesthesia Services. LLC. leading the public to
believe that he is an employee and a part of hospital management (its Director of
Anesthesia Services). R., Vol. I. pp. 109. 111. This also implies that the hospital
provides anesthesia services. not an independent contractor.
All of the anesthesia forms. i.e. the consent forms, pre-anesthesia forms, and
anesthesia records. are all under BMH's letterhead. R., Vol. I, pp 292-295.

3.

BMH has historically engaged in an aggressive marketing and ad campaign, in
print. on the radio, tv and billboards in the area encouraging people throughout the
region to come to its hospital for services. and also claiming that it offered high
quality health care services. R .. Vol. L pp. 96-97, 947.

4.

BMH has not publically indicated that its support services, including anesthesia
care, are not pro\·ided by the hospital. Id.

In support of its Motion for Reconsideration (re: apparent authority), BMH offered an
affidavit of its COO, Jeff Daniels, who again claimed that the hospital does not bill for anesthesia
services. R., Vol. I, pp. 807-809. BMH also offered the (late) Affidavit of Janelle K. Larsen
attaching a number of"Conditions of Admission Forms" allegedly signed by Ellery Navo. R.,
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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. I. pp.

None of those forms are dated at the time that Mr. Navo \Vas admitted to
the ankle

ultimatelv lead to his death. Id.

At no point has BMH disputed the substance of the evidence and claims brought by
Na\ os in the case. Instead, it has consistently taken the position that it had no part in or responsibility for supervising. overseeing. or providing anesthesia services it its hospital. The District
Court excluded Dr. Steinberg solely on the basis that his testimony lacked foundation to sh0vv
that he was familiar with the local standard of care as required under IC § 6-1012-13 (discussed
infra).

ISSlJES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Did the District Court err in holding that Dr. Samuel Steinberg lacked sufficient

kno\\ledge of the local standard of care, as required under Idaho Code§§ 6-101
')

1013?

Did the District Court err in determining on summary judgment that there was

insufficient support for Navos· claim that Sayre was acting as BMJTs agent \\bile performing
anesthesia services on Ellery Navo, under the theory of apparent authority?
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ARGt;MENT

L

STAJ\;DARD OF RE\IEW IS DE

Novo RE\n:w.

The standard of review as it pertains to a review of a decision on summary judgment,
particularly as it relates to the qualification of an expert vvitness. was succinctly summarized by
this Cornt in the recent decision of Malt ox v. Life Care Centers ofAmerica. Inc..

Idaho

_ _ , 337 P.3d 627. 631-32 (2014):
·--on appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Cowi utilizes
the same standard of review used by the district comt originally ruling on the
motion.' Arregui v. Gallegos-V!ain, 153 Idaho 801,804,291 P.3d 1000. 1003
(2012). Summary judgment is proper \Vhen 'the pleadings. depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. shmv that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter oflmv.' I.R.C.P. 56(c).
·'When considering ·vvhcther the evidence shows a genuine issue of material fact,
the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party.' Arregui, 153 Idaho at 804, 291 P.3d at 1003.
'"The admissibility of expert testimony, however, is a threshold matter that is
distinct from whether the testimony raises genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment.· Id. \Vith respect to the threshold issue of
admissibility, '[t]he liberal construction and reasonable inferences standard does
not apply .... ' Dulaney v. Sr. Alphonsus Reg'! ;'\/Jed. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45
P .3d 816, 819 (2002). Instead, · [t]he trial court must look at the vvitness · affidavit
or deposition testimony and determine \Yhether it alleges facts \vhich. if taken as
true, \Yould render the testimony of that witness admissible.' Id.
'·' A district court's evidentiary rulings \vill not be disturbed by this Court unless
there has been a clear abuse of discretion.· 11vicDaniel v. Inland Nw. Renal Care
Grp.-ldaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219,222, 159 P.3d 856,859 (2007). In applying the

abuse of discretion standard, vve ask three questions: ' ( 1) whether the lower court
rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion: (2) whether the court acted \Vithin
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.' Id. at 221-22, 159 P.3d at 858-59."'
Id.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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IL

DR. STEINBERG

TESTIMONY, TAKEN AS TRlTE, MEETS THE THRESHOLD

HL\1 AS A'i EXPERT UNDER IDAHO

Qt AUFYl:\'G

Com:§§ 6-1012-101

The District Court excluded Dr. Steinberg's affidavit for the sole reason that his
testimony did not adequately lay a foundation to suggest that he had the requisite familiarity \"-·ith
the local standard of care, as required under Idaho Code§§ 6-1012-1013. R. VoL L p. 412. In
the District Court·s initial Memorandum Decision. relying in large pan on Schmcchel r. Dille.
148 Idaho 176. 219 P.3d 1192 (2009) (\vhich does not at all address the qualification of experts
under Idaho Code §§ 6-1012-13) the District Court held that Dr. Steinberg could not rely upon
the IDAPA rules to establish familiarity with the local standard of care. R .. Vol. I, p. 41 L The
District Court also parsed Dr. Steinberg's affidavit to suggest that his consultation with Judith
Nagel did not necessarily include information \Vhether the uniform standards of nurse anesthesia
care at hospitals throughout Idaho included BMH. 4 R., Vol. L pp. 409-411. Essentially. the
District Court held that his affidavit did not contain the magic words "including Bingham
Memorial Hospital in Blackfoot, Idaho.•· R., Vol. L p. 410.
On Navos· Motion to Reconsider, wherein Navos pointed out holdings in Suhadolnik v.

Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 114-115, 254 P.3d 11, 15-16 (2011) that suggested Dr. Steinberg
could rely upon governmental regulations for the local standard of care, the District Court parsed
Dr. Steinberg's affidavits further to suggest that the rules and regulations relied upon by Dr.
Steinberg did not have anything to do with the "physical administration of health care services."
R., Vol. I, pp. 503-505. However, the District Court does not specifically indicate how any of the

The District Court erroneously held that Dr. Steinberg never identified BMH as a "rural
hospital," which in fact he did. Dr. Steinberg specifically noted that BMH is listed as a "critical
access hospital," which by federal regulation must be a rural hospital. R., Vol. I, p. 4271 4.
4
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many blatant Yiolations of the Joint Commission standards (adopted by Idaho in its ID APA rules)
do nor specifically apply to the .. physical administration of health care sen·ices." Id.

Since the issuance of the District Court·s decisions, the Idaho Supreme Court bas
addressed this particularly wxing issue. i.e .. an out-of-state expert" s avenues to obtain the
requisite familiarity with the local standard of care to quali1~· as an expert witness. In its recent
decision in Han ox 1·. Life Care Cenrers o/A merica. Inc.. the Court reiterated a framework for
such qualification. emphasizing that it should not necessarily be a .. static:· but rather a .. common
sense·· approach:
.. The guiding question is simply \\hether the affida\it alleges facts \\hich. taken as
true. sho\v the proposed expert has actual knowledge of the applicable standard of
care. In addressing that question. courts must look to the standard of care at issue.
the proposed expert's grounds for claiming knowledge of that standard, and
determine- employing a measure of common sense-whether those grounds
would likely give rise to kncnvledge of that standard. The obligation to
dernonstrate actual knowledge of the local standard of care is not intended to be
·an overly burdensome requirement ... .' Frank v. E S'hoshone Hosp., 114 Idaho
480,+82, 757P.2d 1199. 1201 (1988). Noristhestandardstaticandfirmlyrooted
in past medical practices. Standards of care are sensitive to evolving changes in
the vmy health care services are delivered in the various communities of our State.
Indeed. the Court has recognized that ·governmental regulation. development of
regional and national provider organizations. and greater access to the flow of
medical information,· have provided 'various avenues by which a plaintiff may
proceed to establish a standard of care .... ' Suhadolnik v. Pressman. 151 Idaho
110,121,254 P.3d 11, 22 (201 l).''
Jfattox v. Life Care Centers o/America, inc., supra, 337 P.3d at 633.

In applying this analysis, Dr. Steinberg did establish the foundation for his testimony
necessary to qualify him as an expert under Idaho Code §§ 6-1012-1013. In support of his
opinion, he cited several Idaho statutes and the Idaho Administrative Code, which suggests that
all hospitals in Idaho are subject to the nurse anesthesia provisions under the Joint Commission
standards, as well as the standards set forth by the Council on Certification of Nurse Anesthetists
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 17

or the

on Recertification of Nurse Anesthetists. 5
him to qualify

. L pp. 265-268. That alone was

an expert under the Maltox analysis. Hmvever. he further

consulted with an Idaho official responsible for oversight of the nursing requirements in
hospitals, Judith NageL to ensure that there were no exceptions to the rule, i.e. that "rural
hospitals .. such as BMH did not have to comply v,:ith all of the requirements. 6 R., Vol. L p. 266.
I'v1s. Nagel also reinforced his understanding that there must be collaboration between the CRNA
and a qualified physician. R .. Vol. I. p. 267. In a supplemental affidavit, Dr. Steinberg again
reiterated that the results of his investigation made it abundantly clear that BMH is subject to the
standards set forth under law, \\hich include the Joint Commission standards. JC Vol. I, p. 428.
NexL Dr. Steinberg clearly established the nexus between the Joint Commission and
other standards and the provision of health services in the form of anesthesia care. In essence.
Dr. Steinberg pointed out the abysmal failures of BMH to have any kind of O\ ersight, guidance,
policies, procedures. or agreements between the hospital and the nurse anesthesia services (and
the physicians performing the surgeries). R .. Vol. L p. 267. As a result, BI\1H had absolutely no
safoty or monitoring standards in place, no performance expectations, no assurance that the
hospital had the necessary trained staff equipment, and policies, procedures. and facilities "in

In particular, Dr. Steinberg cited IDAPA 16, Title 13, Chapter 14, IDAPA 23, Title 01,
Chapter 0 1, Idaho Code § 54-1402. R., Vol. I, p. 265.
5

Ms. Nagel is the Associate Director of the Idaho State Board of Nursing. This agency is
the regulatory authority over nurse anesthesia services. R., Vol. I, p. 266 See Idaho Code § 541402( 1)(d)(2). To further assure himself that he was speaking to the appropriate person, Dr.
Steinberg communicated with the Idaho Chief of the Department of Health and Welfare Bureau
of Facility Standards, Debra Ransom, who confirmed that the Idaho Board of Nursing regulates
the provision of nurse anesthesia services in Idaho. R., Vol. I, p. 427, p. 4.
6

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 18

pbcc to care for patients like Mr. Navo.''J R .. Vol. L pp. 266-67. Bl\Hrs failures to fulfil its
statutory and regulatory obligations resulted in a dearth of policies and on~rsight of anesthesia
services at its hospital. which resulted in inherent dangers to patients, in particular those in Ellery
Nan) ·s condition.
In many respects. this case mirrors the Mallox decision. ln that case the Idaho Supreme
Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in striking the affidavit of an out-of-stak
nursing expert, Wendy Thomason. who relied in large part upon being .. familiar with state or
federal regulations governing that (particular) care.'' J/fatlox r. Life Care Centers o/America.

inc.. 337 P.3d at 636. As in this case. Nurse Thomason pointed to ··specific state and federal
regulations governing the operation of' the facility. Id. In so doing. she cited several IDAPA
regulations that govern the --operation of nursing 1~Kilities." Id. Dr. Steinberg has done the same
here, pointing out essential regulatory requirements ignored BMH, and hem. those failures
ultimately affected Mr. Navo's care.
Dr. Steinberg unequivocally opines that:
The departures identified above from the mandatory standards of the Joint Commission
and the requirements of the State of Idaho adversely impacted the provision of care and
treatment for Mr. Navo and. \.vith a reasonable degree of administrative and medical
certainty breached the community standard of care owed to him and resulted in his
eventual death.

R., Vol. I, p. 268.

This testimony should also be taken in context with that of Dr. Peter Schulman, whose
affidavit was ultimately allowed by the Court, who indicated in vivid detail the systematic
failures with regard to Mr. Navo's anesthesia care, which ultimately caused his death. R., Vol. I,
pp. 273-282. This was particularly true given Mr. Navo's complicated health conditions. Id.
7
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This statement alone, taken as true, \\ithout question makes the
of rules and the impact on health care sen ices.

bet\veen

such. the

discretion by suggesting that Dr. Steinberg's testimony did not involve the "physical
administration of health care services ... R.. Vol. L p. 507. Its decision to strike Dr. Steinberg· s
anidavit. effectively dismissing Count III ofNavos· complaint against BM}!, should be reversed.

III.

THE DISTRJCT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING O!'i SFW\.IARY Jl 1DG,:\'JE:'IT \VHETHER

BMH \VAS LIABLE FOR THE CRNA 's CO:\'DlTT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF APPARE'ff
AlTHORITY.

A.

There \Vere at Least Disputed Issues of Fact that Supported Nan,s' Claim of

Apparent Authority.
After striking Navos · hospital expert, Dr. Steinberg, the District Court at first allowed
Navos· claims against B!v1H on Count One to proceed under an agency theory, that is, that the
CRNAs had apparent authority to act for BMH in providing anesthesia services at the hospital.
R., Vol. I, p. 515. Later, after BMH filed its Motion to Reconsider. the District Court ruled as a
matter of law and undisputed fact that Sayre \Vas not Brv1H's agent. either actually or under the
theory of apparent authority, taking that determination out of the jury's hands. Vie\ving the
evidence in the light most favorable light to the Navos, as the non-moving party, that ruling was
an error.
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously weighed in with regard to apparent authority as
it pertains to support services at hospitals. See, Jones v. Health South Treasure Valley Hosp.,

147 Idaho 109, 206 P.3d 473 (2009). Under Jones, the Idaho Supreme Court overturned the trial
court's decision to dismiss the hospital defendant, Treasure Valley Hospital (TVH), for vicarious
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liability of cell saver technicians and the anesthesiologists. both of which were independent
contractors performing support services at the hospital. Id., 147 Idaho at 111-112. 206 P.3d at
475-476. In the Factual Background section of its opinion. the Court noted that TVJI's consent
form did not indicate the cell sawr technicians· status as independent contractors. Id. There is no
reference to what was contained in the form with regard to the anesthesiologists. and at no other
point does the opinion reference the consent form as relevant to its decision. The Court
remanded the case to the trial court to present the question of apparent authority to the jury. Id
The Jones Court discusses the doctrine of apparent authority at length as it applies to
support services provided to hospitals by independent contractors:
"A principal is immune from liability for the negligence of an independent
contractor. or that of its employees. in the performance of the contracted services.
Hcnvever. there are exceptions to the general rule, one being the exception referred
to as · apparent authority.· Liability is imputed to a principal who employs an
independent contractor to perform senices for another which are accepted in the
reasonable belief that the services are being rendered by the employer or by his
servants.·· Id, 147 Idaho at 112. 206 P.3d at 476.
The authority is established when it is traceable to the principal" s manifestations:
·'When determining liability in a situation \\ hen an agency relationship is alleged,
'apparent authority" is defined as the pffwer held by an agent or other actor to
affect a principal· s legal relationship with third parties when a third party
reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and
that belief is traceable to the principal's manifestations.'· Id. at 114,478.
A hospital may be Yicariously liable for other indiYiduals performing support services, regardless
ohvhether they \Vere directly employed:
'·A hospital may be found vicariously liable for the negligence of other individuals
performing support services necessary to complete the patient's treatment. If a
patient does select a particular physician to perform certain procedures ·within the
hospital setting, this does not alter the fact that a patient may nevertheless still
reasonably rely upon the hospital to provide the remainder of the support services
necessary to complete the patient's treatment. Generally, it is the hospital, and not
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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patient. which exercises contra I not only over the provision of necessary
serYices. but
over
personnel assigned to
those services to
the patient during the patient's hospital stay To the extent
patient reasonably
relies upon the hospital 10 provide such services, a patient may seek to hold the
hospital vicariously liable under the apparent agency doctrine for the negligence
of personnel performing such services even if they are not employed by the
hospital." Id. at 115,479.
The hospital owes a duty of care through its employees and independent staff personnel:
·'Liability extends beyond the hospital/physician context. \Vhen a hospital has
received a patient. under whatever circumstance. and has undertaken treatment,
that patient is mved a duty by the hospital through its employees and staff.
including independent staff personnel. to exercise appropriate care to provide for
the patient's well-being and to promote his cure. A. breach of this duty may expose
the hospital to liability in tort ... Some courts recognize hospital liability under
the doctrine of apparent authority when the hospital has established and staffed
facilities or departments through which patients receive specialized care from
medical professionals with whom they do not have a prior or ongoing
relationship-emergency rooms. operating rooms and anesthesiology and radiology
departments." Id.
The standard for determining apparent authority is .. reasonable belieC· not "reliance:·
·'Furthermore. \Ve find that a standard of'reasonable belief rather than ·reliance·
more fairly comports with ldaho's prior case lavv regarding apparent authority ...
We have only required that a person be 'justified in believing· the agent was
acting pursuant to existing authority, rather than relying on the agent's senices, in
order to establish apparent authority. We find no persuasive reasoning for
adopting the more stringent standard ofreliance for cases where the principal is a
hospital.'. Id. at 481. 117.
Finally. in remanding the case for a determination of apparent authority of the hospital
over its ·'independent personnel assigned by the hospital to perform support services,'" the Court
set forth the elements of such claim:
"l)
conduct by the principal that would lead a person to reasonably believe
that another person acts on the principal' s behalf, i, e., conduct by the principal
'holding out' that the person as its agent, and
"2)
acceptance of the agent's service by one who reasonably believes it is
rendered on behalf of the principal." Id. at 1 I 6, 480.
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Jn this case the District Court relied almost entirely upon the alleged "Conditions of
Admissions Form"' as well as the holding in i'anclerelde r. Poppens. 552 F. Supp. 2d 662 (W.D.
Ky 2008)8 to determine. as a matter of indisputable fact and la\v. that Ellery Navo had sufficient
krn)\vledge to suggest that he was aware that the nurse anesthetists providing anesthesia were not
under the direction of the hospital. R .. Vol. I, pp. 1020-23.
Since B\1H clearly held itself out as providing support services for physicians who
provided care at the hospital. the burden is upon the hospital to show that it provided meaningful
notice that it did not control those sen ices. The District Court erred by not more closely
considering the facts and evidence (or lack thereof) on this point. and should have allnwed the
question of the hospital's apparent authority to go to a jury.
Navos presented an abundance of evidence to suggest that the hospital held itself out as
pnn iding support services, including anesthesia. See Statements of Facts, inj,'a. This included
the intense marketing campaign advertising such services. the hospital forms. including the
consent forms, and the listing of a ··manager" of an "anesthesia department" ( \Vith no reference to
an outside company) on its website. This alone should raise an issue of material fact to support
the Navos' claim of Sayre· s apparent authority under the hospital· s proYision of anesthesia
services. The question then becomes whether the hospital provided admissible and undisputed
evidence of meaningful notice, specifically given to its patient, Ellery Navo, to negate the

It should be noted that the Vandevelde does not involve nursing or other support
services provided at the defendant hospital, but rather a physician performing emergency room
services.
8
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implication inherent in

manner of presenting

to the pubhc that support

as

during surgeries at the hospital \Vere not provided by the hospital.
Under the apparent authority standard of reasonable belief and given the stringent
standard applicable to summary judgments where the facts are construed in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party, BMH has failed to negate that implication.
As indicated, the District Court relied almost entirely upon the ''Conditions of
Admission" form prepared by BMH to establish sufficient notice to Ellery Navo. However, in so
doing, the Court made a serious factual error. Ellery Navo was admitted to BMH on December

l 5, 2008. R .. Vol. I, p. 273. However, none of the "'Conditions of Admission Forms" submitted
by BMH in support of its Motion for Reconsideration contain a signature by Ellery
near that date.

0

on or

R., Vol. L pp. 959-970. The only forms provided that have a date are dated

many years prior to this admission. R., Vol. L pp. 960-964. The rest of the fr)rms are undated,
giving the court no reason to believe that, on this admission, Ellery Navo was provided any
notice whatsoever to counter his reasonable belief that Bl'v1H was, like any other hospital,
providing all of the support services. R., Vol. I, pp. 966-970. Thus, the District Court's reliance
upon these inelevant documents was improper and insufiicient to eliminate the apparent agency
established by the Navos' evidence.
This result is particularly apt since, at the time Ellery Navo was admitted on December
15, 2008, he was not admitted for surgery. He was admitted because he had a seriously infected

9

These forms were submitted to the District Court only two days before the hearing on
the Motion for Reconsideration, not giving Navos sufficient time to review the same, recognize
the error, and point out the forms' deficiencies to the court. See Navos' "Motion to Strike
Untimely Affidavits." R., Vol. I, pp. 1006-07.
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ankle. In focusing on the multitude of standard forms pushed in front of his face in order to be
admitted for treatment of his infected ankle. there \Vas no serious reason for him to dwell on the
question of v,hether he could look to BJ\1H, or had to look elsewhere. for superYision and control
of anesthesia sen ices to be proYided during surgery. Even if such a form had been presented.
anesthesia ser\ices \\ere not reasonably on Ellery· s mind at the time. He just needed infection
treatment that \Vas not available outside a hospital.
Since BMH provided no proof that Ellery Navo had been given this form to rcYievv and
sign on December 15, 2015. or more particularly once the decision \Vas made

SC\

era! days later

to perform surgery on his ankle. the "strict duty imposed upon the hospital through its employees

and staff including independent staff personncL to exercise appropriate care to pro\ide fix the
patient's well-being and to promote his cure .. imposed by Jones still applied. There should be no
assumption made about any information the hospital did or did not provide, particularly v,:ith
regard to its support services. 147 ldaho at 115. 206 P.3d at 479. It was an error for the District
Court to do so.
bv• Ellerv• Nam incident to the sur2-erv• that led to
The onlv• relevant consent form sicrned
b
~

his death is the ''Anesthesia and Procedure Consent Form" on BMH letterhead signed December
19. 2008, just minutes before the surgery from which he never awoke. R., Vol. L p. 515.
Nowhere in that BMH form was there any indication that the nurse anesthetists were not
employees or agents of BMH. Id.
The Navos have provided sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief by Ellery
Navo that BMH was the direct provider of its highly-advertized support services, including
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anesthesia services. ln reply. BY1H failed to pro, ide relevant admissible evidence to counter this
lll

context

a motion

summary judgment.

Even if the ··conditions of Admission'· form \Vere relevant and admissible, the District
Court still erred in granting B:V1H summary judgment on the issue of apparent authority. The
Jones decision docs not itself address the question of whether such a consent form could absolve

the hospital from vicarious liability for its support service providers. But there is authority in
other states. that this Court can consider. that indicates that such a consent form is insufficient.
A decision by the North Carolina Court of Appeals is particularly on point. Dif!,gs v.
,Yornnt Health. Inc., 177 N.C. App. 290. 296-30L 628 S.E.2d 852. 858-64 (N.C.App. 2006). In
Dif!,gs. the court considered whether apparent authority applied to anesthesia support services

provided at the defendant hospital. The court. follmving the Second Restatement of Torts,
adopted a test similar to that adopted in Idaho:
--when. however, a hospital does hold itself out as providing services. ,ve believe
the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 is consistent \vith our
prior decisions considering apparent agency. We arc also persuaded by the ,veight
of authority from other jurisdictions. Under this approach, a plaintiff must prove
that ( 1) the hospital has held itself out as providing medical services, (2) the
plaintiff looked to the hospital rather than the individual medical provider to
perform those services, and (3) the patient accepted those services in the
reasonable belief that the sen ices were being rendered by the hospital or by its
employees."
Id. at 862.
The Diggs court further held that ''A hospital may avoid liability by providing

meaningful

to a patient that care is being provided by an independent contractor." Id.

(emphasis added). The question then turned on whether the consent forms provided to the
patient. viewed in the totality of the circumstances, provided ''meaningful notice'' to the patient
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that the support services \\ ere not being provided by the hospital. In so doing. the court first
noted the lack of choice the patient had in choosing an anesthesia provider. and with regard iO

the consent forms, it made a clear distinction hetween !hi! physician proriding the serrices and
the support services:
.. Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to meet this test The hospital had a
Department of Anesthesiology \Vith a Chief of Anesthesiology and a Medical
Director. a fact that a jury could reasonably find indicated to the public that Fl\1C
\Vas providing anesthesia services to its patients. Further. defendants chose to
provide those sen ices by contracting with Piedmont to provide anesthesia
services to the hospital on an exclusive basis. Piedmont doctors served as the
hospitars Chief of Anesthesiology and anesthesia !\Jedi cal Director. As Dr.
McConvil1e put iL his group ·provide[ d] the anesthesia services for the operating
room at Forsyth and so there is-so our group cm ers the surgical caseload.·
Plaintiff and other surgical patients had no choice as to who would provide
anesthesia services for their operations.
'"Plaintiffs affidavit states that she \\as unaware that Dr. McConville and Ms.
Crumb \Vere not employees of the hospital. She explained. 'I did not select Sheila
Crumb nor Dr. Joseph McConville to provide medical care to me: that in choosing
to have my operation at Fors.:,ih :tvledical Center. J relied on the fact that medical
care: would be provided by employees of Forsyth Medical Center. excluding my
surgeon, Dr. Goco.' She further stated: ·[O]ne of the reasons that I had my
operation performed at Forsyth Medical Center was because it was part of Novant
Health. a large healthcare organization .... ·

"In addition, plaintiffpointed to thefcmn on FA1C letterhead that she signed
entitled 'Consent lO Operation and/or Other Procedures.· The form specified: 'I
therefore authorize my physician, his or her associates or assistants to perform
such surgical procedures as they. in the exercise of their professional judgment,
deem necessary and ad\ isable.' (Emphasis added.) By contrast, -with respect to
anesthesia services. the.form stated: 'J authorize the administration ofsuch
anesthetics as may be necessary or advisable by the anesthetist/anesthesiologist
responsible for this service and I request the administration of such anesthetics.'
(Emphasis added.) Finally, the form stated: 'I have had sufficient opportunity to
discuss my condition and treatment with my physician and his or her associates
and all of my questions have been ans\vered to my satisfaction.' (Emphasis
added.)
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This consent form stands in contrast to that provided to the patient in Hoffman. A
could
on this
lhat
through thisfonn
requesting anesthesia servicesfrom F\1C and that---given the
benreen plaintitl's personal physician and the unnamed
anesthesiologist-plaintiff\rns accepting those services in the reasonable belief
that the services 11auld be provided by the ho.\pizal and its employees.

Id 862-63 (emphasis added except vvhere noted in text).
In this case, sirni lar to the Diggs decision. a jury could construe that the language
contained in the ··conditions of Admission Form" applies on~v to services provided by or under
the direction of the physician. and not to support services. The specific language of the consent
form entitled ''LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BET\VEEN HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN" itself
suggests that unless .. otherwise informed in writing'· it only applies to "physicians furnishing
services .. :· R .. Vol.

L p. 966. ~ 6. In contrast, Section 1 of the form suggests that the hospital

lists ··anesthesia" as one of a multitude of distinct services it is providing, including but not
limited to ·'laboratory procedures, radiology procedures, diagnostic procedures, sleep lab stress
testing. medicaL nursing or surgical treatment or procedures. anesthesia, pathology. emergency
procedures. first surgical assistant or hospital services rendered to me under the general and
special instructions of my physician." R., Vol 1. p. 965. § 1. This form is also separate and
distinct from the "Anesthesia and Procedure Consent Fom1" that Ellery Navo signed actually
authorizing a specific nurse anesthetist to provide his anesthesia care. R.. Vol. L p. 950. Again,
that form does not identify the nurse anesthetist as a non-employee or as an independent
contractor of the hospital.
A jury could therefore find that these forms. and the language therein, could have caused
Ellery Navo to reasonably distinguish anesthesia services that are provided by a non-employee
"physician., from such services provided by a hospital employee. This is particularly true given
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the fact that Mr. Navo signed a separate and distinct consent form specifically for the anesthesia
services that does not identif\ the nurse anesthetist as a non-employee. Thus. notwithstanding the
admission forms. this is a question that should go before the jury.

B.

The District Court Had No Basis to Dismiss Navos' Claims for Not Pleading

"'Apparent Authority" as a "Cause of Action."
The District Court held that because .. apparent authority"' was not plead as "a cause of
action·· in Navos· complaint, Navos did not meet the liberal pleading requirements of IRCP

~

8(aJ( 1 ). This decision by the Court is non-sensical and unreasonable.
Count One of Navos · Complaint states. in its first two paragraphs:
19.
20.

The defendants, as providing health sen·ices to the public. m:ved the plaintiffs·
decedent Ellery Navo. and the plaintiffs. as heirs. a duty of care.
That duty of care required that the defendants and their agents failed to exercise
their best medical judgment and render care consistent \\ith the local standard of
care.

R., Vol. L p. 28.
All that is required under the Idaho Rules of Procedure for a proper complaint is for the
plaintiffs to 1) provide a plain statement of the grounds of the court· s jurisdiction, 2) a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and 3) a demand for
judgment for the relief to v,hich (the plaintiff) deems he is entitled. IRCP § 8(a)(l) The Navos'
complaint easily meets this basic ..notice pleading"· requirement. The Complaint simply claims
that BMH provided health services along with the other defendants, and that the negligent
perfonnance of such duties by the hospital or its agents resulted in the wrongful death of Ellery
Navo. Therefore, BMH had notice ofNavos' claims, including the theories of the claim. i.e.
vvrongful death resulting from the defendants' or their agents' negligent care.
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Because BrvlH never
was not

an ;;ms,ver to the

· Complaint and hccause the issue of

in the initial summary judgment

the issue

apparent

authority did not become relernnt until after BMH filed a motion for summary judgment
claiming that Sayre and Monroe. as nurse anesthetists, were not employees of the hospital and
therefore not B\tH· s agents. R. Vol. L pp. 4. 40-41. Prior to that time it \Vas not necessary for
the NaYos to make the claim of apparent agency, since BMH had not enumerated any attirmative
defenses to Navos · claims.
Navos had appropriately plead facts sufficient to raise a question of agency. Although it
did not specifically plead ·'apparent authority.'' it is patently unreasonable to expect a plaintiff to
anticipate all possible defenses to his or her allegations and to plead legal theories that refute
those defenses in the }ctce oft ht! complaint. The District Court therefore ahuscd its discretion by
holding Navos to this extreme standard of pleading.

CONCLUSION
For all these reasons. this Court should reverse the District Court·s decision to dismiss
Navos· complaint against BMH and remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this 3rd day of April. 2015.

Nathan M. Olsen
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